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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Bryan Taylor,
Petitioner,

]
i
]

vs.

]

The Public Service Commission
of Utah and PacifiCorp,

])
]

Respondents.

Brief of Respondent

Case No. 20030694-CA

]

Pursuant to Rules 24, 26, and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, respondents Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission")
and PacifiCorp hereby respectfully submit their response to the brief filed by
petitioner Bryan Taylor ("Taylor") in the above-captioned matter.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of the Commission
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the Commission's determination not to require

PacifiCorp to deviate from its tree-trimming guidelines in the proposed
trimming to be done at Taylor's residence supported by substantial
evidence. This issue is governed by the substantial evidence standard, Elks
1

Lodges 719 & 2021 v. Alcohol Bev. Control Comm n, 905 P.2d 1189, 1193
(Utah 1995). This issue was not preserved for review in Taylor's petition
for rehearing, nor does Taylor's brief contain any citation to the record
indicating that the issue was preserved. However, Taylor's petition for
rehearing did contain a general attack on the Commission's fact-finding, see
record ("R.") 0048. If the Court determines to address the Commission's
fact-finding notwithstanding the deficiencies in Taylor's preservation of the
issue, it should do so by undertaking a substantial evidence review.
2.

Did the Commission otherwise act in accordance with law in

reaching the determination not to require PacifiCorp to deviate from its
tree-trimming guidelines in the proposed trimming to be done at
Taylor's residence. This issue is governed by the correction of error
standard, Anderson v. Pub. Serv. Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 1992).
This issue was not preserved for review in Taylor's petition for rehearing,
nor does Taylor's brief contain any citation to the record indicating that the
issue was preserved. However, Taylor's petition for rehearing did raise the
issue of whether the Commission erred in refusing to consider real property
arguments concerning the absence of an express easement on Taylor's
property, see R. 0048. If the Court determines to address the Commission's
application of the law notwithstanding the deficiencies in Taylor's
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preservation of the issue, it should do so by undertaking a correction-of-error
review.
CITATION TO AUTHORITIES
Statutes, Commission rules, and tariff provisions that are or may be
determinative or of central importance to this appeal are as follows, and are
reproduced in Addendum 1 to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-8; 54-4-1; 54-7-9; 54-7-15; 63-46b-16
Utah Admin. Code R746-310-4.D
Utah Power & Light Co., Utah Electric Service Regulation No. 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is to review a Commission final report and order denying
the relief sought in a consumer complaint proceeding brought by Taylor, a
PacifiCorp residential customer. Taylor filed a formal complaint against
PacifiCorp on April 8, 2003, seeking to a) minimize certain tree trimming
PacifiCorp sought to accomplish on his property; b) reduce PacifiCorp's
clearance distances between power lines and trees and provide more
frequent trimming by PacifiCorp; or c) if neither of the above were possible,
to have PacifiCorp accept liability for aesthetic damage caused by the
trimming PacifiCorp sought to accomplish, see R. 0003. PacifiCorp filed a
motion to dismiss Taylor's complaint on April 23, 2003, seeking an
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expedited resolution because it viewed the trimming to be accomplished at
Taylor's property as urgent, to prevent possible service or safety issues
caused by tree contact with a power line crossing Taylor's property. A
hearing was held before the Commission's Administrative Law Judge on
May 29, 2003, and the Commission issued a report and order on June 17,
2003, denying Taylor's requested relief. Taylor petitioned the Commission
for rehearing and for a stay of the June 17 order on July 7, 2003. The
petition was not granted. Taylor then filed a petition for review of the
Commission's order at the Utah Supreme Court, on August 28, 2003. On
appeal, the Commission, Taylor, and PacifiCorp stipulated to a stay of the
appeal and a limited remand in order for the Commission to clearly
designate the proceeding as a formal adjudicative proceeding under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act. At the same time, the Commission and
Taylor stipulated to a stay of the Commission's order so that the trimming
would not be completed pending appellate review. The Supreme Court
granted the stay and limited remand of the appeal on September 23, 2003.
On September 30, 2003, the Commission issued a procedural order
clarifying that the matter was a formal adjudicative proceeding and a report
and order ("Order") on limited remand denying Taylor's requested relief, but

granting a stay of the proposed trimming pending appeal. Thereafter, the
appeal resumed and was transferred by the Supreme Court to this Court.
The relevant facts underlying this dispute are relatively
straightforward. PacifiCorp's tariff includes a provision that customers must
"permit [PacifiCorp] to trim trees and other vegetation to the extent
necessary to avoid interference with [PacifiCorp9s] lines and to protect
public safety." R. 0007; see also Addendum 1 (Electric Service Regulation
No. 6(2)(c)). To implement this requirement, as well as the requirement in
Utah Administrative Code R746-310-4.D establishing the National
Electrical Safety Code standards as "the minimum requirements" PacifiCorp
is required to follow in its line maintenance {see Addendum 1, R746-3104.D), PacifiCorp established certain standard clearance guidelines for
maintaining a safe distance between vegetation and power lines. R. 0006 at
5. Those clearance guidelines vary by the rate of growth anticipated for the
tree-type at issue, and are publicly available on PacifiCorp's website. R.
0006 at 5; R. 0008; R. 0074 at 20-21 (relevant portions of R. 0074, the
transcript of the Commission hearing in the matter below, are attached
hereto as Addendum 2).
In early 2003, PacifiCorp sought to trim certain trees at Taylor's
property. PacifiCorp began to trim but Taylor objected to the extent of the
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trimming. R. 0006 at 2. Various conversations between Taylor and
PacifiCorp ensued. Eventually Taylor filed a formal complaint with the
Commission seeking to reduce the clearance distances PacifiCorp sought to
accomplish with its trimming. PacifiCorp's testimony, which Taylor does
not dispute, is that the proposed trimming was consistent with PacifiCorp's
guidelines. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 73). There was no testimony that
Taylor was subject to any discrimination by PacifiCorp. Therefore, although
other facts also emerged—including facts demonstrating PacifiCorp's
willingness to implement an alternative solution such as burying the line at
issue if Taylor paid for that solution in accordance with PacifiCorp's
approved tariff (see Addendum 2, R. 0074 at 80)—the fundamental fact at
issue became the reasonableness of PacifiCorp's guidelines themselves.
Assuming arguendo that Taylor has adequately preserved any relevant issue
for appeal, the question of whether there was substantial evidence for the
Commission's determination that Taylor failed to demonstrate the
inappropriateness of the PacifiCorp's proposed clearance distances is now
the key issue on appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

TAYLOR HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE AND

ADEQUATELY PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS. Through a failure to

6

follow rules of appellate procedure, failure to preserve issues for appeal by
raising them in a petition for rehearing before the Commission, and failure to
appropriately marshal the evidence, Taylor has failed to preserve and
appropriately present his arguments for appellate review. He has not,
therefore, met his burden to show that he was substantially prejudiced by the
Commission's order, and that the order was unconstitutional, erroneously
interpreted or applied the law, was not supported by substantial evidence, or
was otherwise arbitrary or capricious. See Beehive Telephone Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm n of Utah, 2004 UT 18, % 17, 89 P.3d 131, 138 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16); Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^ 23, 48
P.3d 918, 927, n. 9 ("We decline to address this claim because it has not
been properly briefed. A single, vague sentence without citation to the
record or legal authority is inadequate.") (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439, 450 (Utah 1988) (noting that appellate courts are not a "'depository in
which a party may drop the burden of argument and research.5") (quoting
Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981))). In the
absence of Taylor meeting this burden, there is no basis to sustain Taylor's
appeal.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION WAS

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS OTHERWISE
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IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. Even if the Court determines to look
beyond the deficiencies in Taylor's briefing and review the sufficiency of
the Commission's underlying order, Taylor has not met his burden to show
that the order was unconstitutional, that it erroneously interpreted or applied
the law, that it was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was
otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Rather, the order was supported by
substantial evidence and was otherwise in accordance with law.
ARGUMENT
I.

TAYLOR HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE AND ADEQUATELY
PRESENT HIS ARGUMENTS.
As the appellant, Taylor bears the burden to marshal all of the

evidence supporting the Commission's order, and show that "despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." See Johnson-Bowles
Co., Inc. v. Division of Securities ofDept. of Commerce of State of Utah,
829 P.2d 101, 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quotation omitted). In
accomplishing this, Taylor is required to follow rules of appellate procedure
as well as statutory requirements regarding the preservation of issues for
appeal. See, e.g., Beehive Telephone Company, 2004 UT 18,ffij6-7; Utah
Associated Municipal Power Systems vs. Public Service Commission of
Utah, 298 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1990). Taylor has failed to follow
8

appropriate appellate procedure, failed to preserve issues for appeal, and
failed to marshal the evidence.
A.

Failure To comply With Appellate Briefing Requirements
And To Preserve Issues For Appeal.

Taylor fails to comply with a number of the rules of appellate
procedure. Because of this, Taylor's arguments are precluded from
appellate consideration and should be disregarded by the Court. Recently,
the Utah Supreme Court noted its concern for this type of failure and the
possible consequences.
[W]e find ourselves compelled to address the necessity of
complying with our appellate briefing requirements.
"Our rules of appellate procedure clearly set forth the
requirements that appellants and appellees must meet
when submitting briefs before this court. See Utah R.
App. P. 24. The rules are easy to understand and offer a
step-by-step approach to writing an appellate brief." .. .
Compliance is mandatory, and failure to conform to these
requirements may carry serious consequences. For
example, "[b]riefs which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court." Utah. R. App. P. 24(j).
Beehive Telephone Company, 2004 UT 18, f 12 (quoting MacKay vs.
Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998)).
Taylor did not preserve his issues for appeal and has failed to show
that they were preserved for appeal. Taylor is required to provide "citation
to the record showing that the issue was preserved." See Utah R. App. P.
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24(a)(5)(A). This is particularly important in an appeal of a matter decided
by the Commission because an applicant may not urge or rely on any ground
not set forth in the application [for rehearing before the Commission] in an
appeal to any court." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). An issue is not
preserved for appeal unless it has been specifically raised in a petition for
rehearing before the Commission. Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems, 298 P.2d 298 at 300.l Any issue Taylor wishes to raise in this
Court must have been specifically identified in his Petition for Rehearing
filed with the Commission in July of 2003 (found at R. 0048, Petition for
Rehearing, pages 1-9).
Contrary to Appellate Rule 24(a)(5) requirements, nowhere in
Taylor's brief has he cited where any of the six issues he raises in his
appellate brief were preserved for appeal. A comparison of Taylor's
Appellate Briefs six issues (Brief of Petitioner, pages 1-2) and his
arguments (Brief of Petitioner, pages 6-13) with his Petition for Rehearing
before the Commission (R. 0048) shows that what Taylor attempts to raise
before this Court is precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). It

1

This statutory provision also precludes Taylor from attempting to
raise an issue not preserved through inclusion in his Commission rehearing
request through Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(5)(B) or any
other means. Utah Associated Mun. Power v. PSC, supra, at 300, n.l.
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appears that Taylor's appellate briefing efforts are trying to address Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) points, alone, rather than the requirement of Utah
Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b). The closest Taylor comes to meeting his need
to establish preservation of an issue is his appellate Issue 4 and argument
(that the Commission "erred by ignoring property law concerning
easements." Brief of Petitioner, at page 12) and his Commission Petition for
Rehearing point two ("Complainant does not argue that the Commission is a
court of law which may determine the existence or extent of property
rights." R. 0048 at 2) and point six ("It [the Commission] may not be (sic) its
jurisdiction to determine easement rights, but it does have the authority and
duty to consider facts of record and law." R. 0048 at 7). But even here,
Taylor still fails to recognize that the Commission does not have any
authority to rule upon the existence or extent of any easement which
PacifiCorp may or may not have on Taylor's real property. See, Basin
Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305
(Utah 1975).
Whatever the Commission's views on the nature of PacifiCorp's
property interests in Taylor's real property, the Commission has authority to
address only the terms and conditions of PacifiCorp's service—in this
instance, the reasonableness of PacifiCorp's maintenance of its electric
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utility plant and the application of PacifiCorp's tariff regulations concerning
the trimming of vegetation which may interfere with its utility plant and
operations. In considering Taylor's complaint against PacifiCorp below, the
Commission did not have authority to resolve the dispute on the basis of a
ruling on the real property interests the parties may or may not have. Cf.,
Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858
(Utah 1984) (Commission action and rule set aside where there is no explicit
statutory authority upon which the rule was based).
B.

Failure To Marshal Evidence In Support Of The Order.

Appellate Rule 27(a)(7) requires Taylor to marshal record evidence
supporting the Commission's order. Taylor challenges the Commission's
determination without making any effective effort to marshal the record
evidence supporting the Order or showing that the record evidence does not
support the ultimate ruling made in the Order. Because of Taylor's failure to
comply with this appellate requirement, his challenge fails. The Court "must
assume that the evidence supported the [Commission's] findings." Utah
Medical Products v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998); see also, Hogle
v. Zinetics Medical, Incorporated, 63 P.3d 80, 85 (Utah 2002) ("To mount a
successful challenge . . . the appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
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insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below." Internal quotation and citations and omitted);
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Appellant must become the devil's advocate and
marshal every scrape of competent evidence in support and then point out
the fatal flaw in the evidence.).
Taylor's Appellate Brief reads as if he is seeking to retry his case
below. Taylor seemingly asks this Court to become a trier of fact, consider
and weigh evidence and grant relief by ordering PacifiCorp to engage or not
engage Taylor-specified activities and award Taylor damages. See, e.g.,
Appellate Brief at 13. By so doing, Taylor asks this Court to commit error
by substituting itself in the role of the Commission and substituting its
judgment for the Commission's; to exercise legislative authority given to the
Commission and not Utah courts. Cf., Utah Department of Business
Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 614 P.2d 1242, 1250 (Utah 1980)
("The review by this [Utah Supreme] Court of the orders of the PSC is
confined to the legal issues . . . . Any interference by this Court beyond the
aforementioned limits would constitute an interference with the lawmaking
power of this state."); Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 615 ("[T]he public authority empowered
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to regulate and 'supervise all of the business9 of a public utility, U.C.A. §
54-4-1, is the Commission, not this Court/'); Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph v. Public Service Commission, 155 P.2d 184, 188 (Utah
1945) (The court, refusing to substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission, noted "that is not our function. Indeed, it is not a judicial
function. It is legislative and is to be exercised by the arm of the legislature,
the Public Service Commission.").
As before the Commission below, Taylor apparently recognizes no
procedural end to his effort to present additional evidence. For example,
Taylor asks this Court to consider an alleged, inappropriate elevator
conversation involving the Administrative Law Judge, when Taylor never
made the Commission aware of such an issue. This error is similar to
Taylor's erroneous effort to present new, additional evidence after the
parties had the opportunity to present their evidence at the hearing held May
29, 2003, the Commission closed the record and issued its June 17, 2003
order. With his Petition for Rehearing filed with the Commission July 7,
2003, Taylor asked the Commission to consider additional evidence
(material and statements which Taylor views as supporting his contentions
of an appropriate trimming practice and distance) he had not introduced at
the hearing. See R.0050, Exhibit B: Correspondence from Salt Lake City
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Urban Forestry Division to Bryan Taylor, attached to Petition for Rehearing.
He did so without explanation of why this new evidence or similar evidence
was not available at the time of the May 29, 2003 hearing or why he did not
or could not have introduced the material at the hearing. Taylor also failed
to provide a supportable basis to permit use of the hearsay evidence that he
included in his post-hearing material in contravention of Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-10(3) ("A finding of fact that is contested may not be based solely on
hearsay unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence."). Taylor continues to rely upon this post-hearing material in his
argument before this Court without explanation of how it can be
appropriately viewed as received record evidence and used in consideration
of any argument. Apparently, in Taylor's view, the record never closes—
indeed, significant portions Taylor's Appellate Brief appear to have no basis
(and certainly none is cited) in the existing record.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION WAS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND WAS OTHERWISE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
A.

The Order Was Supported By Substantial Evidence.

The action below was a consumer complaint proceeding. As
complainant, Taylor was required to "specify the act committed or omitted
by the public utility that is claimed to be in violation of the law or a rule or
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order of the commission." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-9(2). As complainant,
Taylor also then bore the burden of persuasion to demonstrate PacifiCorp's
violation of law, or Commission rule or order. See, e.g., Peoples Finance &
Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444,446 (Utah 1972) (burden of proof and of
ultimate persuasion of all of the essentials of cause of action were on
plaintiff); In re Portland General Elec. Co., UM 989, Order No. 01-152,
2001 WL 306733, *1 (Or. PUC Feb. 2, 2001) (Under the customer
complaint statute, "the moving party, the complainant, has the burden of
persuasion."). Taylor argues that the Commission erred in requiring Taylor
to meet this burden of persuasion (see Appellate Brief, Issue 1), but cites no
authority for that proposition. Instead he cites cases demonstrating the noncontroversial proposition that Taylor was entitled to a fair hearing. Id. at 6.
On appeal, Taylor again bears the burden to demonstrate that the
Commission's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. See, e.g., Grace
Drilling v. Board ofReview, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App.1989).
Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence, but
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 68. It is "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion." Id. (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho
257, 715 P.2d 927,930 (1985)).
In its briefing before the Commission and at the hearing, PacifiCorp
submitted competent evidence that its tree-trimming clearance distances
were consistent with those of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Addendum 2 (R.
0074 at 8-10, 13-17); R. 0006 at 5, n. 10 (citing Mathews v. Georgia Power
Co., 333 SE2d 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (utility had responsibility to
maintain a 15-foot clearance between trees and power line); Motto v. West
Penn Power Co., 1995 WL 945202, *8 (Pa. PUC Dec. 8, 1995) (minimum
of 8 feet clearance from any conductor); Re Connecticut Light and Power
Co., 92 P.U.R.4th 50 (Conn. DPUC Mar. 23, 1988) (approving tree
trimming program with clearance requirements of 8 feet along side, 10 feet
below and 15 feet above all primary conductors)). It submitted competent
evidence that its clearance distances were consistent with industry bestpractices. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 13-17). It submitted competent
evidence that its clearance distances were necessary to protect the public
safety and service reliability, based on an appropriate trimming cycle and
taking into account factors such as wind, snow accumulation, and sagging
power lines. Id. (R. 0074 at 23, 49). It submitted competent evidence that
its tree-trimming guidelines were publicly available on its web site and that
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they were provided to customers such as Taylor, as a door hanger, when
trimming was to be performed. Id. (R. 0074 at 28-29). Finally, PacifiCorp
submitted competent evidence that its clearance distances were consistent
with the National Electrical Safety Code, as required by Commission rule.
See id. (R. 0074 at 12-13).
In response, Taylor questioned the objectivity of PacifiCorp's
evidence, but provided no actual evidence undermining the objectivity of the
sources cited by PacifiCorp. Id. (R. 0074 at 37-40). Taylor also submitted
evidence from an arboricultural society that "topping" a tree is not an
appropriate trimming practice. Id. (R. 0074 at 54). PacifiCorp agreed with
that view and submitted evidence that it had no intention of "topping"
Taylor's trees since this was not an accepted PacifiCorp practice. Id. (R.
0074at77).
Taylor's principal arguments in the hearing were focused on the
alleged need for easements and on the precedential effect of PacifiCorp's
past trimming practices. But Taylor's presentation did not provide a
reasonable basis for rejecting PacifiCorp's clearance distances, in light of
industry practices and the uncontroverted evidence that the clearance
distances are consistent with the National Electrical Safety Code as required
by Commission rule. In short, Taylor provided no substantial evidence that
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PacifiCorp's proposed trimming would violate any law, Commission rule or
Commission order, or that its clearance distances were unreasonable, and
certainly did not provide sufficient evidence to now demonstrate that the
Commission's Order was not based on substantial evidence. In such
circumstances, the Commission did not err in rejecting Taylor's request to
order PacifiCorp to deviate from its trimming guidelines.
B.

The Order Was In Accordance With Law.

Taylor's arguments that the Commission committed legal error have
largely focused on the Commission's determination not to consider evidence
on the existence, or lack thereof, of a PacifiCorp easement at Taylor's
property. As noted above, this argument fails to recognize that the
Commission does not have any authority to rule upon the existence or extent
of any easement which PacifiCorp may or may not have on Taylor's real
property. See, Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah,
531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). Whatever the Commission's views on
the nature of PacifiCorp's property interests in Taylor's real property, the
Commission has authority to address only the terms and conditions of
2

The Appellate Brief also makes new, vague allusions to
constitutional due process and property rights. As these arguments may
relate to the burden of proof they are addressed above. As the arguments
relate to due process and fairness, the record in its entirety shows that Taylor
received a full and fair hearing of his complaint. See, e.g., generally R.
0074.
19

PacifiCorp's service—in this instance, the alleged unreasonableness of
PacifiCorp's maintenance of its electric utility plant and the application of
PacifiCorp's tariff regulations concerning the trimming of vegetation which
may interfere with its utility plant and operations. In considering Taylor's
complaint against PacifiCorp below, therefore, the Commission did not have
authority to resolve the dispute on the basis of a ruling on the real property
interests the parties may or may not have. Cf., Kearns-Tribune Corporation
v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) (Commission
action and rule set aside where there is no explicit statutory authority upon
which the rule was based).
While the Commission could not consider property rights that concern
issues beyond the scope of its jurisdiction, it could consider PacifiCorp's
tariff. That tariff has the force of law, and allows PacifiCorp to trim
Taylor's trees to the extent necessary to protect public safety and reliable
service. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles,
681 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1984) ("Courts have consistently held that tariffs
have the force of law."); Addendum 1 (Electrical Service Regulation 6).
Moreover, if easements were required and the Commission were bound to
consider them—as PacifiCorp pointed out in the hearing, the very tariff
section providing for Taylor's obligation to allow trimming to the extent

20

necessary to protect the public safety and service reliability, also provides
that, if necessary, a customer shall - without cost to PacifiCorp - convey any
easements across the property necessary or incidental to PacifiCorp's
furnishing of service to the customer. Addendum 2 (R. 0074 at 85-86);
Addendum 1 (Electric Service Regulation 6).
The determination of whether PacifiCorp was violating any law, rule
or order subject to the Commission's jurisdiction reflected the end of the
Commission's legislative authority to make a determination in this matter.
The Commission did not commit error in failing to account for arguments
about easements that were outside the scope of its jurisdiction, nor has
Taylor demonstrated that the Commission's order unconstitutional, arbitrary
or capricious, or in any way contrary to law.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Taylor has not followed required procedure, has not appropriately
preserved his arguments, and has not marshaled the evidence. Even if he
had done these things, the Commission's Order was supported by substantial
evidence, did not violate Taylor's constitutional rights, was not arbitrary or
capricious, and was otherwise in accordance with law. For these reasons,
the Commission's Order should be affirmed and Taylor's petition for review
dismissed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 ra day of June 2004.

Sandy Mooy
'
Attorney for Public Service
Commission

Gregory B. Monson
David L. Elmont
STOEL RIVES LLP

Attorneys for PacifiCorp
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 23,20041 caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to each of the following:
Bryan Taylor
2504 Beacon Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Sander J. Mooy
Public Service Commission of Utah
160 E. 300 S. 4th Floor
P.O. Box 45585
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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54-3-8. Preferences forbidden — Power of commission to determine facts.
(1) No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other
respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or subject any person
to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities, or in any other respect,
either as between localities or as between classes of service.
(2) The commission shall have power to determine any question of fact arising under
this section.
54-4-1. General jurisdiction.
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such
public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or
in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of
Transportation Act.
54-7-9. Complaints against utilities — Scope.
(1) When any public utility violates any provision of law or any order or rule of the
commission:
(a) the commission may file a notice of agency action; or
(b) any person, corporation, chamber of commerce, board of trade, or any civic,
commercial, mercantile, traffic, agricultural, or manufacturing organization or
association, or any body politic or municipal corporation may file a request for agency
action.
(2) The notice or request shall specify the act committed or omitted by the public
utility that is claimed to be in violation of the law or a rule or order of the commission.
(3) No request for agency action shall be entertained by the commission concerning
the reasonableness of any rates or charges of any gas, electrical, water, sewerage, or
telephone corporation, unless the request is signed by:
(a) the mayor, the president or chairman of the board of trustees, or the
commissioners, or a majority of the council, commission, or other legislative body of the
city, county, or town within which the alleged violation occurred; or
(b) by not less than 25 consumers or purchasers, or prospective consumers or
purchasers, of the gas, electricity, water, sewerage, or telephone service.
(4) The commission need not dismiss any complaint because of the absence of direct
damage to the complainant.
54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission — Application — Procedure —
Prerequisite to court action — Effect of commission decisions.
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder,
bondholder, or other person pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied
with an order of the commission shall meet the requirements of this section.
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the
action or proceeding, any stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in

the public utility affected may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in the action
or proceeding.
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in
an appeal to any court.
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 20 days is
denied.
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without suspending the
order involved, the commission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after
final submission.
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing within 20 days, the
order involved is affirmed.
(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or postponed, an
application for review or rehearing does not excuse any corporation or person from
complying with and obeying any order or decision of the commission.
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies an original
order or decision has the same force and effect as an original order or decision, but does
not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right, arising from the original order or
decision unless so ordered by the commission.
(4) An order of the commission, including a decision on rehearing:
(a) shall have binding force and effect only with respect to a public utility that is an
actual party to the proceeding in which the order is rendered; and
(b) does not determine any right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or
responsibility with respect to a public utility that is not a party to the proceeding in which
the order is rendered unless, in accordance with Subsection 63-46a-3(6), the commission
makes a rule that incorporates the one or more principles of law that:
(i) are established by the order;
(ii) are not in commission rules at the time of the order; and
(iii) affect the right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility
with respect to the public utility.
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:

(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agencyfs record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Admin. Code R746-310-4
D. General Requirements - Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the
requirements contained in the National Electrical Safety Code, as defined at R746-3101(B)(13), constitute the minimum requirements relative to the following:
1. the installation and maintenance of electrical supply stations;
2. the installation and maintenance of overhead and underground electrical supply and
communication lines;
3. the installation and maintenance of electric utilization equipment;
4. rules to be observed in the operation of electrical equipment and lines;
5. the grounding of electrical circuits.

P.S.CU. No. 44

Original Sheet No. 6R.1
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
ELECTRIC SERVICE REGULATION NO. 6
STATE OF UTAH

Company's Installation

1.

COMPANY'S INSTALLATION
Except as otherwise provided in these Regulations, an Electric Service Agreement, or the Electric
Service Schedules, the Company will install and maintain its lines and equipment on its side of the
Point of Delivery, but shall not be required to install or maintain any lines or equipment except meters
and accessories beyond that point Only the Company is authorized to make the connections at the
Point of Delivery. Electric service furnished under this tariff will be alternating current, 60 hertz,
single or three-phase, at one of the nominal standard voltages available from the Company at or near
the Customer's location.

2.

COMPANY FACILITIES ON CUSTOMER'S PREMISES
(a)
All materials furnished and installed by the Company on the Customer's premises, shall be,
and remain, the property of the Company. The Customer shall not break the Company's
seals. In the event of loss or damage to the Company's property, arising from neglect,
carelessness, or misuse by the Customer, the cost of necessary repairs or replacement shall
be paid by the Customer.
(b)

Customer without expense to the Company shall make or procure conveyance to the
Company of satisfactory Rights-of-Way Easements across the property owned or controlled
by the Customer for the Company's lines or extensions thereof necessary or incidental to the
furnishing of service to the Customer.

/^~\
\
(

(c)
/
•^^
(d)

The Customer shall permit access by the Company's representatives at all hours to maintain
electric distribution facilities on the Customer's premises. The Customer shall permit the
Company to trim trees and other vegetation to the extent necessary to avoid interference
with the Company's lines and to protect public safety.
The Customer shall give the Company the right to enter the Customer's premises, at
reasonable times, for the purpose of reading meters, inspecting, repairing or removing
metering devices and wiring of the Company.

Issued by authority of Report and Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah in Docket No. 01-035-01
Advice No. 01-10
FILED: November 8,2001

EFFECTIVE: November 2,2001
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1

identification)

2
3

DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q

(BY MR. ELMONT:) Good morning, Mr. Miller.

4

You've already been sworn in.

Would you state your

5

place of employment and your position there?

6

A

I'm Assistant Forester with PacifiCorp.

7

Q

And what's your business address?

8

A

I'm at 230 North Temple office which is 1407

9
10
11
12

West North Temple here in Salt Lake, zip code 84116.
Q

Can you give us your educational and

professional background?
A

I have a bachelor's degree in horticulture

13

and a master's degree in urban forestry.

14

educational background.

15

horticulture and arboriculture when I was a teenager

16

in 1976 and I have been working in the field ever

17

since.

18

nursery arboriculture firm landscaping contractors.

19

I have worked in -- for a golf course, a country club|

20

in Chicago which is a great job.

21

That's my

I first became involved in

I have held positions in private industry for|

I also worked for two years in Utah as a

22

state community forester.

I had a great job in the

23

state educating people about trees and urban

24

community forestry throughout the state.

25

that's where I got interested in utility

In fact

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC. (SOI) 3^S - 11 81 B
8

1

J circumstances

2

I accomplished

3

A

4

6

on Mr. Taylor's

Q

primary

property?

Safety Code.

And what subsection within Section D would

( specifically

7

that needs to be

Yes, it does because it ties to the

International

5

of the pruning

apply in the case of trimming around the,

conductor?

8

J

9

I installation

A

That would be subsection two,
and maintenance

supplies and the communication

11

maintenance
Q

13

15

I'd

A

document?

J reviewed.

18

I

Q

National

Safety Code that was referred

Public Service Commission

17

Tree

like you to turn to Tab B, if you would.

This is a 1993 edition of the

I Electrical

16

lines.

rules that we

If you turn to page 2 within Tab B which

actually marked at page 67, can you read

20

Section
A

This is Section 218 f

sub(A)(l).

23

supply conductors

25

J NOTE:

is

for us

218(A)(1)?

22

24

to the
just

19

21

underground

is maintenance.

Can you identify that

14

the

of overhead

10

12

j

tree

trimming

"Trees that may interfere with

Normal

should be trimmed or

ungrounded]

removed.

tree growth, the combined movement

trees and conductors under adverse

weather

DEPOMAX Rfc]?ORtlNG SERVICES, irfC . (feul) 32fe-116ti
12

of

1

leverage tree biology and tree health to our

2

advantage to clear the tree and maintain tree health

3

in the context of providing a safe and reliable

4 J electric power as we possibly can.
5 I

Q

Does that mean that there are no absolute

6 I minimum clearance distances which you cannot go for
7

safety purposes?

8

A

9

No.

It does not mean that at all.

I mean,

there are things that are dangerous, and we have an

10

obligation to correct those.

11

Q

12

I'd like to turn with you, then, to sub 2

within Tab E.

13

A

Can you identify this page?

This was actually in a section that Rich

14

Buelte presented, but I put the slide together.

15

is a page, the picture here, of the distribution pole

16

with a cross arm and some squares around it is a page)

17

out of our specification manual.

18

is our clearance guidelines.

19

guidelines that we use for moderately growing trees,

20

fast growing trees moderately fast that we define as

21

trees that grow between one and three feet a year.

22

This!

And what it shows

This happens to be the

That's important because I think that some

23

of the trees involved in the Taylor property are

24

slower growing than this and we allow less clearance

25

than this particular frame or slide depicts.
1

But the|

DEPOMAk kEIPOktltiG SERVICES, INC. (fa0 I J 325-lI««
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1 I permanent thing here to the side, our clearance
2

requirements are 10 feet and underneath 12 feet for

3 I moderately fast growing trees.

For slow growing

4 J trees, we would reduce that to eight feet on the side]
5

and 10 feet underneath.

But these are guidelines we

6 I set up around which we work with the tree to achieve
7

our clearances.

8
9

So if there were clearances available at
nine feet, if this was a natural target at nine feet,

10

that would be fine.

11

side, that would be fine.

12

workers that we employ some discretion in this manner]

13

so that we are looking out for the health of the

14

tree.

15

Q

16
17

If it was at 11 feet to the
We allow the trained

How close can a trained worker get to a line|

in trimming without cutting the power for safety?
A

There is an industrial standard ANSI Z133

18

that specifies an approach, minimum approach

19

distances.

20

electrical training it is 10 feet.

21

within 10 feet of an energized power line.

22

someone who is trained, it is 2 feet 4 inches below

For untrained workers somebody with no
They cannot work
For

23 I 5,000 feet and at 5,000 feet and above around here,
24

it would be 2 feet 8 inches.

So even somebody with

25

an electrical training who makes their living
DEPOMAX ftSEbkTItiG SfcRVICES, INC. (tiOl) 325-1188
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1
2
3
4

Q

Thank you.

bullet point
J to provide

says

A

"Clearances

are guidelines

3 years of clearance."

the tree trimming

5

Turning back to Tab E - 2 , the topi

cycle

for the

Yes, that's right.

are -- tree work

7

three and four years depending

8

type of trees.

9

clearances
Q

11

other

12

A

13

Company?

for the company

cycles

are between

on elevation

our

for three years of clearance.!

And is that consistent with the cycles
jurisdictions

j

or the

Here in the Salt Lake valley

are designed

identify!

Our tree trimming

6

10

cycles

Does that

intended

to your

in

knowledge?

Yes, they are, particularly

ones in our

region.

14

Q

Thank you.

I'd

like to turn your

attention

15

then to Tab E-3, the final bullet point part of a

16

summary

says,

17

managed

and based on the industries best p r a c t i c e s . "

18

Is it your testimony, Mr. Miller, that

19

vegetation management policy of PacifiCorp

20

compliance with the industry's best

21

A

I do.

22

I'm

23

recognized

24

Q

25

management

"Utah Power's program

is

professionally]

in fact

the

is in

practices?

I wrote this and I stand behind

very proud of our program,
around the country

Thank you.

it.

and I think that we ' re|
for our

expertise.

Does the Company's

policy as implemented

vegetation

comply with

the

bEPOMAX kfcfroktlttG afikvicES, I N C . (faOl) 328-llbb
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1

the tariff?

2

A

I think so, yes.

3 I

Q

And are they consistent with the

4 J presentation you made to the Commission in
5

September 2000?

6 I

A

Yes, they are.

7

Q

I'd like you to turn with me to Tab H.

8 I Would you identify that document please?
9

A

This is a page from our website describing

10 J our tree work.

People can have questions about our

11

work and access PacifiCorp's website and read about

12

what we intend to do.

13

synopsis of our work.

14

And it just provides a

Again, if you look about our tree trimming

15

section it talks about fast growing trees and the

16

clearance we require:

17 J growing 10 feet.

14 feet, medium 12 and slow

And then underneath we also see

18

pictures of the type of shapes that we might get

19

from, from tree work, trees that are growing

20

associated with power lines.

21

secrets.

22

many people don't like the way it looks.

23

discuss our work up front and this has been on our

24

website for several years now.

25

Q

We don't want any

We want people up front because midline
We want to

So it is your testimony this is publicly

bfcpOMAX kSfrofrfiNG afckVlcES, I N C . (801) 328-1188
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1

foliage would be taken off of them and they might

2

killed.

3

entirely.

4
5

Our recommendation

is to remove those

There's a locust that
I do some light trimming,

I believe

just a couple of

6

light trimming.

7

roughly that's my understanding

8

propose

9

Q

And the plum is already

on the Taylor

trees

just has to
branches
done.

So

of the tree that we

property.

And having described

that proposed work,

10

it your testimony

11

Company's vegetation management

is

that it will be consistent with

12

A

To the

13

Q

Thank you.

14

be

the

policy?

letter.
I don't have anything

further

at

this point.

15

A

16

Thank

you.

JUDGE TINGEY:

17

CROSS

18

Q

19

made

20

quite

My first question

clear that you've been in with PacifiCorp

A

For ten years

22

I

Q

Okay.

PacifiCorp,

for

And

now.

so your paycheck

comes

from

right?

24

A

That's

correct.

25

Q

Okay.

So given that time, I'd

1

is you

sometime?

I

fafcPOMAX kfifrokflN6

now

EXAMINATION

(BY MR. TAYLOR:)

21

23

You get to ask questions

sfikvicfcs,

itoc.

(bol)

say

you

32ft-imb
37

1

JUDGE TINGEY:

2 J

MR. ELMONT:

Okay.

I thought you might.

And just for your information

3

in terms of the two tree removal thing, either

4

through Mr. Taylor or if you would like us to bring

5 J Mr. Buelte to answer that question, I believe we're
6

talking about 20 to 30 trees total.

7

that would need to be removed.

8

that in testimony if you want me to ask the question

9

I will, or just to sort of clean up the point that

10

But we can elicit

Mr. Miller is making.

11
12

So two of those

FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q

(BY MR. ELMONT:)

Mr. Miller, do you view

13

the ANSI guidelines in any way in conflict with the

14

NESC standards?

15

A

Absolutely not.

16

Q

When you talk about the ten-foot clearance

17

requirement, does that take into account wind, snow

18

and other types of variance that can impact how the

19 I branches move?
20
21
22

A

Right.

Lines sag and the wind blowing the

wire, the wind blowing the tree.
Q

And finally, could you explain why it is

23

that removal of all or nearly all of the foliage on

24

the couple of gamble oaks that are the issue, why

25

that would possibly or likely kill the tree?
DfePOMAX kE^OktlNG SERVICES, INC. (SOI) 325-1188
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1

And I don't have, you know, the three-ring

2

binders to pass out, but I will show you this and sayj

3

there are different views on tree trimming --

4

JUDGE TINGEY:

5

MR. TAYLOR:

6

know, but it has been around.

You can just see the

7

big no sign, says no topping.

You know, so that's

8

something one arborist society is clearly

9

they don't think that's necessarily appropriate tree

10

How many copies?
You know, just that.

You

indicating

trimming practices.

11

You know, and in this case, you know, I'm

12

not legal trained or anything like that, but this is

13

an issue that's important to me.

14

person and I think that citizens should as much as

15

they can stand up for their rights.

16

the matter is that they have this policy of appeal

17

and notification to the customer which really is no

18

appeal.

19

totally 100 percent vested in the power company

I'm a principled

And the fact of

It's really just sending out one more person]

20 I telling you that we are going to do this and it is
21

our right and you have no say in it.

22

the matter is and, you know, that the public at large]

23

generally doesn't have either the will, the where

24

with all, whatever, to necessarily refute that when

25

people who present themselves as a person in
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1
2 I

Company's position on topping generally?
A

I'll address topping first.

I think in my

3 I earlier testimony, I talked about a desire to avoid
4

topping wherever possible, but topping is a damaging

5 I practice.

I'm not familiar with the Colorado tree

6

coalition or that group but that is excellent

7

literature there.

8

But topping is defined at reducing the

9

height of a tree to a predetermined clearance limit

10

and making arbitrary cuts on the trunk of the tree.

11

That's a definition in the ANSI 300.

12

it very, very clear that predetermined

13

limits are outside of our specifications and we have

14

guidelines and we look to natural targets.

15

I think we made|
clearance

Now as far as the plum is concerned, it's

16

not topped.

I mean, if you can take a look at the

17

picture -- of the picture of the topped tree from the|

18

Colorado tree coalition that Mr. Taylor just talked

19

about, and that's an organization, there's no

20

foliage.

21

heading cuts made.

22

inappropriate.

23

tree, there were still branches coming up and

24

foliage.

25

called crown reduction cuts down to laterals, which

There's just large branches with big
All the foliage is removed.

It's!

When we saw the pictures of the plum

We made thinning cuts.

We made what are
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